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ABSTRACT
This article considers the issues arising out of international
criminal law's incoherence in dealing with child soldiers as
perpetrators. Particularly those aged fifteen to seventeen. This
article discusses the legal and moral concerns of attaching criminal
responsibilityto adolescent soldiers before proposing that prosecuting
adolescent soldiers may be appropriatein certain circumstances. In
doing so, the article recognizes the tension between international
law's normative commitment to protect children and the duty to end
impunity and seek justice for the victims of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. It proposes how this tension might be resolved
through case-by-case application of the criminal defenses of superior
orders and duress, and suggests how these defenses might be applied
to recognize the specific characteristicsof adolescent soldiers.
INTRODUCTION

The image that springs to mind at the mentioning of "child
soldiers" is often that of a young, skinny, African boy snatched from
his loving family, glassy-eyed from drugs and alcohol, clinging to a
towering gun. This is the picture that the world confronted during
previous conflicts, such as the Sierra Leone civil war (1991-2002), the
1
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genocide in Rwanda (1994), and the civil war in Uganda (1986present). This image fills most with dread, sorrow, and anger an
iconic image of the loss of innocence during armed conflict.
However, the "child soldier" has many faces, and the legal and
moral position of underage combatants is significantly more complex
than such images suggest. Child soldiers present a distinct legal issue
because they are simultaneously victims and perpetrators. Numerous
international conventions have sought to address and prevent the use
of child soldiers,' but tens of thousands of children under the age of
eighteen continue to be deployed in national armies and opposition
groups across the globe. 2
* Maria Achton Thomas, LL.B (London Metropolitan University), LL.M.
(NUS), Solicitor of England and Wales. An earlier draft of this article was
submitted as part of the author's LL.M (International and Comparative Law)
program at National University of Singapore in 2012/2013. The author would like
to thank her dissertation supervisor, Professor Simon Chesterman, for his advice and
guidance during the research and writing process.
1. See generally Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 4, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art.
77, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov.
29, 1985) [hereinafter Beijing Rules]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A.
Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC]; Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc
A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter The Protocol]; UNICEF PRINCIPLES

AND GUIDELINES ON CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES OR ARMED
GROUPS (2007) [hereinafter PARIS PRINCIPLES].

2. In 2001, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers estimated this
number at 300,000, but they no longer provide estimated figures because of the
difficulty in accurately doing so. See UNICEF, MACHEL STUDY 10-YEAR
STRATEGIC REVIEW: CHILDREN AND CONFLICT IN A CHANGING WORLD (2009),

available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a389ca92.html [hereinafter MACHEL
STUDY]. In 1996, the international community also tried to address the issue of
child soldiers with the establishment of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflict, following the publication of Graga
Machel's first report, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Children:
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, G.A. Res. 51/306, U.N. Doc. A/51/306
(Aug. 26, 1996). One of the key recommendations in the report was that the military
age be raised to eighteen. MACHEL STUDY, supra. The mandate was established
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Although child soldiers have participated in carrying out horrific
crimes in both international and internal conflicts, 3 the focus in
international law has been on assigning criminal responsibility to
those recruiting child soldiers, rather than the actions of the child
soldiers themselves. This is reflected in the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute"), which makes it a war
crime to conscript or enlist children under the age of fifteen into
national armed forces or actively use them in hostilities. 4 At the same
time, the Rome Statute bars jurisdiction over anyone under the age of
eighteen, and therefore, cannot be utilized to hold child soldiers
accountable.
International criminal law (ICL) is being developed to deal with
child soldiers as victims, but its capacity to deal with child soldiers as
perpetrators is less apparent. The Rome Statute presents a
jurisdictional barrier and does not assist us in answering why child
soldiers should not be held criminally responsible for war crimes and
crimes against humanity under international law.

through a General Assembly Resolution, which indicated a weak link to UNICEF
and UNHCR, and without allocating mandated funds. See The Rights of the Child,
G.A. Res. 51/77, 35, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/77 (Feb. 20, 1997). Seventeen years
later, this still has not materialized in many countries, including the United Kingdom
and United States. See, e.g., http://www.child-soldiers.org. This raises a question as
to the existence of a genuine political will to deal with the problem, but also
highlights that, even if there was consensus to address the issue, no one really knows
how to solve it. For further detail of the mandate of the Special Representative, see
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Children and Armed
Conflict, http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org.
3. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder,
Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone, ch. VI (July 1999), available
at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99-05.htm#Pl308_2
17192.
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The
International Criminal Court's (ICC) first sentence was fourteen years'
imprisonment for forcible enlistment and conscription of child soldiers. Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Sept. 2002), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/LubangaCis Eng.pdf
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This article's primary concern is combatants aged fifteen to
seventeen, referred to here as "adolescent soldiers," 5 because they
represent a more complex category than those aged fourteen and
below. There are no suggestions in ICL that children below the age of
fifteen can or should be held criminally responsible for their
participation in armed conflict, irrespective of their involvement. 6
Additionally, there is a general prohibition on using anyone under the
age of fifteen in armed conflict.7 However, there is no such blanket
ban on fifteen to seventeen-year-olds.
This article does not suggest that the International Criminal Court
(ICC) should prosecute adolescent soldiers. Nor does it suggest a
likelihood that future ad-hoc war crimes tribunals may choose to
indict anyone under eighteen. But, whether an international tribunal
may charge fifteen to seventeen year olds is not purely hypothetical.
For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) has
jurisdiction over persons above the age of fifteen. 8 There was
significant debate at the time it was established as to how the vast
number of child soldiers should be dealt with. 9 Outside of the ICC
and ad hoc tribunals charging adolescent soldiers, an important
question remains as to why, if at all, adolescent soldiers should be
treated as a special category. This policy question is important
because of the need for a post-conflict society to gain a sense of
closure and to seek justice for the victims. It also affects the way
former adolescent soldiers are reintegrated into their communities and
their continued rehabilitation in the aftermath of armed conflict.
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to determine how the
culpability of adolescent soldiers should be assessed with respect to

5. As distinguished from "child soldiers," which refers to any combatant under
eighteen years of age, including the very young and those who are barred from
legally participating in armed conflict. See infra Section I(A)(2).
6. However, there are instances where children under fifteen have been
prosecuted by domestic regimes for war crimes. See infra note 159.
7. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 38.
8. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 7, Aug. 14, 2000, available
at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-uClndlMJeEw/ 0 3D&.
9. See discussion infra Part I(C)(1).
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the alleged commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.o
This will be considered in three stages.
Section One will consider the position of adolescent soldiers
under ICL and why this presents a legal and a moral problem. This
will highlight the special position occupied by adolescent soldiers as
both victims and perpetrators of war crimes. This section will argue
that exempting adolescent soldiers from criminal responsibility for
war crimes exclusively on the basis of age is undesirable and that
ICL's current age limit is incoherent and misdiagnoses the problem.
Further, Section One will argue that situations exist where, subject to
careful examination of case-specific facts, it would be desirable to
prosecute adolescents in order to secure justice for the victims and
promote stability and reconciliation.
Sections Two and Three will address the tension between
culpability and a commitment to the special characteristics of minors.
This article will attempt to resolve this tension through the application
of the defenses of superior orders and duress, which would allow for
recognition of the specific characteristics of adolescents. In order to
determine the applicability of these defenses, the development of the
respective doctrines will be examined."
This article will argue that these defenses should be given
considerable weight in assessing individual criminal responsibility,
but should be applied on a case-by-case basis, rather than
categorically. 12 Finally, this article will argue that abandoning the
10. There is no consensus on whether children and adolescents can ever be
successfully prosecuted for genocide, partially because it is unclear whether they
may possess the necessary mental element of an "intent to destroy in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. For
that reason, this article generally focuses on war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
11. This discussion is limited to superior orders and duress. The omission of
other defenses such as mental disease, intoxication, and self-defense does not imply
that they are not similarly applicable to questions of child soldier culpability.
12. It is acknowledged that imposing an age limit of fifteen may appear
equally arbitrary. However, it is necessary to establish a threshold age, and it seems
sensible to do so at fifteen. First, there is a general prohibition on using anyone
under fifteen in armed conflict. This prohibition is found in the CRC, and a part of
customary international law. See discussion infra Part I(A)(2). Second, the position
is supported by the decision to exclude anyone under fifteen from the jurisdiction of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See discussion infra Part I(C)(1). Third, the
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artificial age limit imposed by ICL would be beneficial in formulating
a coherent strategy to handle adolescent soldiers. This would enable
victims to seek redress when appropriate, and equally important,
provide guidance for domestic legal systems to safeguard the rights of
adolescent defendants.
I. THE CHILD SOLDIER PROBLEM

Children have fought in endless conflicts throughout history1 3 and
continue to be present in many of today's conflicts. However, ICL
has not issued a clear statement regarding attaching criminal
responsibility to minors. This is partly a definitional problem, as there
is no consensus between states on the definition of childhood.
A. Who is a Child?
Despite UNICEF's calls for an official adoption of eighteen as the
age of majority, the definition of "child" remains inconsistent in ICL.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC")
defines a child as "every human being below the age of 18 years,
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained
United Nations defines "youth" as the age between fifteen and twenty-four,
indicating a shift from childhood to adolescence at age fifteen. See Cecile Aptel,
Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of
InternationalCriminal Courts 2, n.3 (UNICEF Innocenti Research Ctr., Working
Paper No. 2010-20, 2010). It has been proposed by one writer to lower the age limit
to twelve because this is lowest age limit suggested during the negotiations of the
Rome Statute. See Joseph Rikhof, Child soldiers: Should they be punished?, SWORD
& SCALE - CBA NAT'L MIL. L. SEC. NEWSL. (Can. Bar Assoc., Ottawa, Ont.), May

2009, at 8, available at http://www.cba.org/CBA/newsletters-sections/pdf/05-09military_2.pdf. However, this writer considers this limit too low and finds that there
is little, if any, support in ICL for this position. Id.
13. Children have been used in virtually every war and armed conflict in
history. See ILENE COHN & GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT: A STUDY ON BEHALF OF THE HENRY DUNANT

INSTITUTE 23 (1994). Today's arms technology has enabled even young children
carrying powerful automatic weapons, which has made children even more
attractive as combatants. Id. Today, it is estimated that at least twenty states were
using children in armed conflict between 2010 and 2012. See CHILD SOLDIERS
INT'L, LOUDER THAN WORDS: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION TO END STATE USE OF

CHILD

SOLDIERS

18

(2012),

available

at

http://www.child-

soldiers.org/global-report-reader.php?id=562.
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earlier." 1 4 Although the CRC provides a default age of eighteen,
countries remain free to determine a lower limit. But, there is no
guidance as to what this limit should be. In a study on the role of
children in armed conflict, authors Ilene Cohn and Guy Goodwin-Gill
note that having municipal law determine the definition of a "child"
results in conflicting and unsatisfactory practices between countries.' 5
They go on to explain that the point at which a child becomes an adult
varies in different circumstances, with the most common definition
being the age at which voting rights are granted.16
A practical difficulty can be the verification of the child's actual
age. A combination of a lack of formal documentation and falsified
information by national armies makes it difficult for a child to prove
his or her real age. For example, some former Burmese child soldiers
claim to have been simply ignored when they informed recruitment
staff of their age.17 And, in other cultures, age is of less importance
and a child may simply not know or care if he or she is sixteen,
seventeen, or eighteen years old. 18
Finally, cultural differences can be an important consideration.
One writer notes that with an average life span of thirty-seven in
Sierra Leone, a fifteen-year-old is effectively middle-aged.1 9 While
this is a harsh conclusion, a fifteen to seventeen year old individual in
western Africa may be expected to display a higher degree of maturity
in his or her community than someone of the same age who has grown
up in a Western country.2 0

14. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 1.
15. COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 13, at 6-9.
16. COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 13, at 7.
17. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY GUN WAS As TALL As ME: CHILD SOLDIERS
IN BURMA, 47 (Oct. 2002). [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2002].
18. See, e.g., ILPA, WHEN IS A CHILD NOT A CHILD? ASYLUM, AGE DISPUTES
AND
THE
PROCESS
OF
AGE
ASSESSMENT
(2007),
available at

http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/1 3266/ILPA-Age-Dispute-Report.pdf.
19. Joshua A. Romero, The Special Court for Sierra Leone and The Juvenile
SoldierDilemma, 2 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 8, 11 (2004).
20. This cultural argument is difficult to accept because the voting and driving
age in Sierra Leone is eighteen, similar to that of many Western states. See CIA, The
World Factbook, CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2123.html. This contradicts the assertion that a higher degree of
maturity should be assumed. Rather, this writer would argue that there is a wide
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1. Minimum Age for CriminalResponsibility
Distinct from the definitional issue is the determination of the
minimum age at which criminal responsibility can be attributed to an
individual ("MACR"). The Beijing Rules, a set of United Nations
rules on the administration of juvenile justice, provide guidance for
establishing the age of criminal responsibility: "In those legal systems
recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for
juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age
level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual
maturity."21 Unfortunately, this vague guidance is unhelpful in
ensuring a consistent approach by countries, especially considering
that the MACR has wide regional variances. 22
As a result, the legal answer to the question "Who is a child?" is
highly contextual. For example, in the United Kingdom, a person
must be eighteen years old to vote in general elections 23 and purchase
alcohol, 24 seventeen to drive a car, and sixteen to marry and join the
army; 25 yet someone as young as ten years old is deemed capable of
possessing the necessary mens rea to commit a criminal offense. 2 6

difference in the maturity and degree of responsibility of children from different
social classes, particularly between urban and rural children.
21. Beijing Rules, supra note 1, at rule 4.
22. In the East Asia and Pacific regions, the average MACR is nine. See
UNICEF, SOUTH ASIA AND THE MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:
RAISING THE STANDARD OF PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 6 (2005). In the

South Asia region, it is seven years. Id. In contrast, Europe's average MACR is
thirteen. Id.
23. See, e.g., FAQs-Who is eligible to vote at a UK general election?, THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION,

http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/faq/voting-and-

registration/who-is-eligible-to-vote-at-a-uk-general-election
2013).

(last visited Oct. 17,

24. See, e.g., Young people and the law, THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT,

https://www.gov.uk/alcohol-young-people-law (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
25. Parental consent is required for both joining the army and marriage if the
person is under 18. See Marriage, Civil Partnership and Divorce, THE UNITED
KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, https://www.gov.uk/marriages-civil-partnerships/overview
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013); Can I join?, THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT,

http://www.army.mod.uk/join/20193.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
26. Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 50 (U.K.) (as amended by

§ 16).
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This wide range of ages does not assist us in defining "child" in
the context of adolescent soldiers. Thus, if we cannot find a
satisfactory legal answer, it becomes necessary to consider on a moral
basis whether an adolescent, with reference to his age, 27 should be
held accountable for his actions.
Children and adolescents are considered more docile, more easily
manipulated, and are more likely to be fearless and take greater
risks. 28 Research shows that the preference for risk-taking peaks
around seventeen years of age, 29 perhaps coinciding with increased
physical maturity and the consequent ability to cause greater harm.
Other factors, such as impulse control, anticipation of future
consequences, and resistance to peer influence all increase linearly
from early to late adolescence. 30
The notion that children under eighteen years of age can
inherently understand right from wrong can be deduced from the
overwhelming majority of countries that have established their
domestic MACR below eighteen. 3 1 However, when children under the
27. Adolescent soldiers are generally referred to as males. However, this is
solely for the purpose of consistency and does not indicate that the issues discussed
here relate only to boys. Despite common misconceptions, it is estimated that up to
forty percent of child soldiers currently deployed in non-state groups, and less
frequently, in some state armies, are female. See e.g., Jordan A. Gilbertson,
Comment: Little Girls Lost: Can The International Community Protect Girl
Soldiers?, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REv. 219, 219-20, 222-23 (2008). While often given
the role of "bush wives" (i.e. sex-slaves), they too are involved in front line fighting,
and should not be considered outside the scope of this paper. Id.
28.

MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS ININTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2005).

29. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development
Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 745 (2009).
30. Id.
31. In 1998, UNICEF research listed the countries that fixed their MACR at
eighteen: Belgium, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru and
Uruguay.
See Juvenile Justice, INNOCENTI DIGEST (1998), available at
http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest3e.pdf. According to a 2007 study,
these countries have since all revised their MACRs, which now range from twelve to
sixteen years. Id. As for the characteristics of juvenile justice systems, guidance can
be found in the Beijing Rules, and will usually involve specific procedures designed
to safeguard the juvenile's rights and interests, such as more lenient sentencing
guidelines. See Beijing Rules, supra note 1. The Beijing Rules provide that juvenile
records must be kept strictly confidential and must not be used in subsequent adult
proceedings. Id. at Rules 21.1-2. This has been incorporated in some jurisdictions,
which operate with a system of sealed records and results in the juvenile's criminal
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age of eighteen are charged, they are typically prosecuted under a
separate juvenile justice system, which focuses on rehabilitation and
This also allows for
reintegration, rather than punishment.
consideration of the offender's incomplete mental development.
Usually, the juvenile framework imposes more lenient sentences. And,
while custodial sentences are permitted, they are often viewed as a last
resort. These principles are reflected in the CRC, 32 as well as in nonbinding instruments, such as the Beijing Rules and the Paris

Principles. 33
2. Minimum Age for Participationin Armed Conflict
Another issue is the lack of consensus on the minimum age for
participation in armed conflicts. The two international instruments
dealing with this issue are the CRC and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
in armed conflict ("The Protocol"). The CRC sets the age limit for
recruitment into armed forces at fifteen and obligates the country to
record being expunged after he or she turns eighteen. See, e.g., Crimes, CASLON
ANALYTICS, http://www.caslon.com.au/austprivacyprofilel6.htm.
This does not
usually apply to serious offenses. Id. In the United States, juvenile records are
usually sealed. See e.g., Sean E. Smith, Sealing Up The Problem Of California's
"One Strike And You're Out" Approach For Serious Juvenile Offenders, 32 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 339, 340 n.10 (2009-2010). However, twenty-five states bar this
for juveniles who have committed violent offenses. Id. England and Wales remove
a juvenile's conviction after a specified time, which is adjusted according to the
length of the sentence. Sentences exceeding thirty months can never be removed,
effectively excluding serious offenses such as rape and murder. So, although many
jurisdictions may permit for the destruction and restriction of access to a juvenile's
record through one process or another, this rarely applies to offenses of the nature
that we are concerned with here. However, the Beijing Rules do not distinguish
between violent or non-violent crimes, and this should be considered if prosecutions
of adolescents under ICL are pursued. See Beijing Rules, supra note 1.
32. The CRC has been ratified by every member of the United Nations apart
from Somalia, South Sudan, and the United States. Somalia's failure to ratify the
CRC can be explained by their lack of a functioning government for more than two
decades. See e.g., Jaap E. Doek, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child:
Some Observationson the Monitoringand the Social Context of its Implementation,
14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 126 (2002-2003). The United States became a
signatory to the convention in 1995, but has yet to ratify it. Id.
33. See infra Part I(A)(1) on the Beijing Rules' definition of the appropriate
minimum age for criminal responsibility.
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"take all feasible measures" to prevent anyone under fifteen from
directly participating in hostilities. 34 The Protocol prohibits
recruitment of anyone under the age of eighteen into non-state armed
groups, but permits voluntary recruitment of fifteen to eighteen-yearolds into national armies.
In contrast, UNICEF and other non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) are calling for a complete ban on anyone under eighteen
participating in armed conflicts, whether on the side of the national
army or armed non-state groups. 36 This has been opposed in the
international arena because many countries continue to recruit persons
under eighteen into their national armies. 37 The problem equally
persists in relation to armed non-state groups, where effective
regulation of recruitment is even harder. 38
As we have seen, there is no international consensus as to what
constitutes a child or childhood. And, there is no obvious connection
between the age of criminal responsibility and the age for participating
in armed conflict. Thus, the general position is that child soldiers are
to be treated primarily as victims. 39 But, a similarly clear statement
regarding when individual criminal responsibility should apply is
absent.
B. Why Do Children Callfor Special Protection?
If we accept the argument that minors are often sufficiently
mature to understand right from wrong and therefore bear criminal
responsibility in domestic legal systems, the question becomes, "Why
are children nevertheless regarded as requiring extra protection?" Do
34. CRC, supra note 1, art. 38(2)-(3).
35. The Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3(3), 4.
36. See, e.g., Mission Statement by Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflict, CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT,
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/zero-under-18-campaign/,
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2013); See also Our Vision, CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L,
http://www.child-soldiers.org/about-us.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
37. For details on various national policies on child soldier recruitment, see
generally COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS

2008
(2008),
GLOBAL
REPORT
soldiers.org/global-report-reader.php?id=97.

available

at

http://www.child-

38. COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 13, at 65.

39. PARIS PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.6.
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we protect minors because of the specific harm that might come to an
individual child, or to establish a general principle that will protect
other minors?
This article argues that minors should primarily be considered
victims in armed conflict. As one writer correctly points out,
"Children do not go looking for conflicts in which to participate; war
comes to them." 4 0 Children are often the biggest losers in an armed
conflict, both in the immediate term because of threats to their
security, and in the long-term because their access to education and
healthcare is interrupted. 4 ' With families being torn apart and
communities destroyed, children involved in armed conflicts face
uncertain futures.
At the same time, children and adolescents have been responsible
for extreme brutality in various conflicts, with Sierra Leone being a
prominent example. Do children in this context deserve extra
protection simply because they are under eighteen? This article
argues that every child should be afforded protection because of the
particular harm that might come to him or her as a result of being
drawn into armed conflict, and that every measure should be taken to
prevent juveniles' participation in armed conflict.
However, by limiting ICL, jurisdictionally or otherwise, to only
those over eighteen, minors are not protected on a larger scale. A
universal agreement on the minimum age for recruitment into armed
forces would send a much needed signal to the international
community and would provide a more convincing normative
statement.
This article suggest that the commitment to protect minors does
not conflict with the possibility of subjecting juveniles to judicial
processes in the same way as domestic legal systems.
1. The Vulnerability of Children and Adolescents in Armed Conflict
It is unsurprising that children and adolescents removed from the
family structure, voluntarily or not, and forced to take part in frontline fighting will be deeply affected psychologically. When assessing

40. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 12.
41. CoHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 13, at 23.
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the actions of an adolescent soldier, their participation can be broadly
split into two phases.4 2
We can call the initial stage "the transition phase." This period
encompasses initial recruitment and often includes threats and
coercion, which many adolescent soldiers follow merely out of fear.
Many at this stage act against their will and are likely to be aware that
what they are doing is wrong.43
The next phase may be described as the "indoctrination phase,"
where acts of violence become the norm. The adolescent soldier no
longer questions the morality or wrongfulness of his actions.4
Unfortunately, some individuals are more easily indoctrinated or more
willing to carry out acts of brutality than others. Presumably, the ease
of transition from school to soldier will depend on a variety of
parameters, including family background, level of education, and
other socio-economic factors.
The strategy employed by those recruiting children reflects the
transition described above. Recruiters attempt to "break" the new
recruit so he or she will obey orders unquestioningly. Former child
soldiers in Sierra Leone report being subjected to extraordinarily
brutal "induction rituals" where they are forced to kill family members
or village elders in front of the community, making them both unable
to return home and hardened by the act of killing. 45 In Burma, the new

42. The two 'phases' are meant to be general in nature and are described in
this way to illustrate the development set out in the literature considered. It is not
intended to suggest that a particular structure exists. It should be noted that these
proposed "categories" could apply to any soldier, regardless of age, particularly
where he or she has been forcibly recruited. It is not proposed that a person upon
reaching his fifteenth birthday, or any other specific age, suddenly possesses the
clarity of mind to avoid indoctrination. A discussion of the changing of the
normative perspective of adults through their participation in armed conflict falls
outside the scope of this article, but it should not be assumed that many of the
principles discussed here would not be equally true for adults.
43. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COERCION AND INTIMIDATION OF CHRD

SOLDIERS

TO

PARTICIPATE

IN

VIOLENCE

(April

2008),

available

at

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/2008.04_ChildSoldiers.pdf.
44. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 15-18.

45. Id. at 10; see also Amnesty Int'l, Sierra Leone: Childhood-a casualty of
conflict, Al Index AFR 51/069/00, 12 (Aug. 31, 2000).
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recruits are subjected to hard training regimes, and those who attempt
to escape face serious repercussions if caught.4 6
2. Recruitment of Child Soldiers
As discussed above, international law has not been helpful in
establishing a clear minimum age for participation in armed conflict.
As a result, the recruitment of underage combatants has continued
across the globe. 47 Armies and armed groups recruit children for two
primary reasons. First, national armed forces typically rely on young
recruits when adults are in short supply. 4 8 Credible evidence suggests
that this is a motivating factor in places like Burma, where the legal
official age for joining the Tatmadaw Kyi-Burma's national armyis eighteen. 49 This problem is compounded by the fact that recruiters
are paid a commission for bringing new recruits, and thus have an
incentive to do so without regard to age.5 o These recruiters rely on
children because they are more easily tricked, scared, forced, or bribed
into the army. 5 ' Second, non-state armed groups who are unable to
conscript rely on a combination of forced recruitment and voluntary

46.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOLD TO BE SOLDIERS - THE RECRUITMENT AND

USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN BURMA, 50-54 (2007) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH 2007].

47. The development of lighter weapons has been blamed for the increased use
of children on the front line. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 5. Previously, children
commonly played the roles of spies, porters, and mine sweepers. Id.
48. COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 13, at 24-25; see also HAPPOLD,
supra note 28, at 8-11.
49. Defence Services Act, 1959 (amended in 1974); War Office Regulation,
1974, 13/73; see CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L, LOUDER THAN WORDS--CASE STUDY:
at
available
(2012),
FOR
CHANGE?
A
CHANCE
MYANMAR:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/507d260332.html.
50. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2007, supra note 46, at 29-31. The report notes
that in 1988, the Tatmadaw was comprised of fewer than 200,000 soldiers. Id. In
the mid 1990s, the Tatmadaw was to be expanded to 500,000. Id. However, in
2002, the number was reported at 350,000, although the accuracy of this remains
unclear. Recruiters reportedly receive "between 20-40,000 Kyats (approximately
U.S. $20-40), a bag of rice, and occasionally a tin of cooking oil for each recruit."
See COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, MYANMAR: SHADOW REPORT
TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 6 (2011) [hereinafter COALITION].
51. COALITION, supra note 50, at 7.
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enlistment.5 2 These groups recruit children largely because of the
characteristics considered in section I(A)(1)."
However, children do volunteer to join national armies and rebel
groups for a variety of different reasons.5 4 Voluntary enlistment is
often caused by socioeconomic factors, a desire for revenge, or
support for one particular side in a conflict." In a seminal 1996 report,
author Graga Machel questioned whether such enlistment could ever
be considered genuinely voluntary because the decision would always
be based on external factors beyond the young person's control. 56
As we have seen, adolescent soldiers remain in national armies
and armed opposition groups and continue to commit atrocities
without accountability. Historically, this area of tension has received
little attention, and even where the problem is considered, as seen in
Sierra Leone, there has been a failure to adequately address the
problem.
C. ICL Response to the Child Soldier Problem
Neither the Nuremberg Charter,5 7 nor the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East Charter,5 8 sets a minimum age for armed
conflict. And, no one under the age of eighteen has ever been charged
under either Charter. Similarly, neither the Statute for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), nor the
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"),
52. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2002, supra note 17, at 33.
53. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 10.
54. At least in some conflicts, the number of children that volunteer is
relatively small. According to Human Rights Watch's 2002 report, the estimated
percentage of volunteers is only five percent. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2002,
supra note 17, at 33.
55. MACHEL STUDY, supra note 2, 38.
56. Id.
57.

CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Aug. 8,

1945, art. 6, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.
makes no reference to a minimum age for jurisdiction. Id.
58.

Article 6

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST CHARTER

[CONSTITUTION],
Jan.
19,
1946,
art.
5,
available
at
http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/04/4-06/military-tribunal-fareast.xml#treaty-headerl-2. Article 5 makes no reference to a minimum age for
jurisdiction.
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specifies jurisdictional age limits. In fact, the youngest defendants
prosecuted by the ICTY and ICTR were both in their early twenties.5 9
1. The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is the only example of an
international tribunal where child soldiers have been given specific
consideration. The Security Council resolutions establishing the
SCSL,6 0 ICTR, and ICTY all use similar language when granting
jurisdiction over those most responsible for crimes within these
tribunals' jurisdictions.6 1 However, then Secretary-General Kofi
Annan proposed a different interpretation in the context of Sierra
Leone. 62 In his report to the Security Council, Annan suggested that
when judging who is "most responsible," the "severity and scale of the
crimes" should be considered, rather than looking exclusively at
military or political leadership. 63
Annan emphasized that although children should primarily be
regarded as victims, their involvement in conflict had reached an
unprecedented level of brutality. 64 His report proposed three solutions:
(1) anyone under eighteen should be exempt from prosecutions; (2)
those between ages fifteen and eighteen must participate in a truth and
reconciliation or similar process; or (3) those in this age group should

59. The defendants were twenty-three and twenty-four at the time the crimes
in question were committed. See Prosecutor v. Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21AR73, Appeal Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. of Rwanda Oct. 27, 2006),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNyira%5Cdecisions%5C2710
06.pdf; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeal Judgment (Int'l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Oct.
7,
1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aj971007e.pdf
[hereinafter
Erdemovic].
60. The SCSL was, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, an agreement between the UN
and the Sierra Leone government. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315
(August 14, 2000).
61. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); see S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
62. Id.
63. U.N. Secretary-General, Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 30, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
64. Id. $ 32.
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go through the judicial process in accordance with generally accepted
juvenile standards, but without the possibility of punishment. 6 5
On one hand, the people and the government of Sierra Leone
wanted to see judicial accountability for those guilty of war crimes,
irrespective of age. 66 International NGOs concerned with the welfare
and rehabilitation of children opposed this, arguing that a judicial
process for anyone under eighteen would hinder his or her
rehabilitation. 67 In an attempt to satisfy both sides, the SecretaryGeneral proposed a special "Juvenile Chamber" in the event
proceedings were issued against anyone under eighteen. 68 For
juvenile defendants, the Secretary-General proposed that the penalty
should not involve imprisonment, but rather focus on correctional or
educational measures. 69
The Security Council rejected the broader interpretation proposed
by the Secretary-General and argued that the Tribunal should only be
concerned with those in a leadership role.70 The Council believed that
the truth and reconciliation process should play a significant role,
which it subsequently did.71 Further, the Council felt it appropriate to

65. Id. 33.
66. Id. 35. Whether the Sierra Leone government did indeed push for a
lower age limit is disputed. See Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for
Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25:2 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 391, 415 (2001). No Peace Without Justice (NPJW) reports that this is
inaccurate, and that the inclusion of the provision did in fact originate from the
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. Id. According to NPWJ, Sierra Leone
argued for a lower age limit of seventeen, which is also the age at which full
criminal responsibility can be assumed under Sierra Leone law. Id.
67. U.N Secretary-General, supra note 63, 35.
68. Under this proposal, the Office of the Prosecutor was to be staffed by
people experienced in gender and juvenile related justice. Id. 37. In the event of a
juvenile trial, the juveniles' release should be secured, the juvenile must be
separated from adult defendants, and "all legal and other assistance and order
protective measures to ensure the privacy of the juvenile" must be provided. Id.
69. Id.
70. U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from the President of
the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234
(Dec. 22, 2000)
71. A key difference between traditional judicial process and truth and
reconciliation is that the latter is a voluntary process. This may make it an unsuitable
solution where there is a strong demand for the accused to be held accountable for
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formulate Article 7 of the Statute, the provision on special
considerations for minors, in very general terms. 72 Article 7 was
subsequently amended on the recommendation of the SecretaryGeneral to specifically exclude jurisdiction of persons below the age
of fifteen and to include an express prohibition on prison sentences for
anyone between fifteen and eighteen at the time of the crime. 73
Although not specifically mentioned, it is likely that these decisions
also hinged on the capacity of the tribunal. In Sierra Leone, an
estimated 5,000 or more children took part in the fighting. 74 As the
Prosecutor subsequently recognized, even if they only indicted the
most violent perpetrators, there would still simply be too many.
Despite the language of Article 7, correspondence between the
Security Council and Secretary General acknowledged that
prosecutions of anyone under eighteen were unlikely.76
And,
arguably, Article 7 was included merely to satisfy the Sierra Leone
government and maintain the Tribunal's legitimacy in the eyes of the
Sierra Leone people. The indication that "those most responsible"
was to intended to mean "those leaders most responsible" essentially
foreclosed the possibility of prosecuting any children. And, while it
was left to the prosecutor to ultimately decide whom to indict, there is
little indication that the prosecution of any children was ever a real
possibility.
When the prosecution did announce, during the early stages, that
no one under the age of eighteen would be indicted, the reasons
indicated largely reflected the Security Council's considerations that
the primary focus should be on the rehabilitation and reintegration of
the children back into society, that there were simply too many
perpetrators, and that the SCSL was created to prosecute "those most
their actions. See UNICEF, CHILDREN AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION FOR SIERRA LEONE (2001).

72. U.N. Security Council, Letter, supra note 70.
73. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/40 (Jan. 12, 2001).
74. It is estimated that another 5,000 were associated with the armed rebel
groups in other capacities. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 10.
75. David M. Crane, Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West
African Experience, 15 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 3, 11, 15 (2008).
76. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter, supra note 73.
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responsible," which excluded former child soldiers.77 Instead, the
prosecution indicted "those most responsible" on counts of illegal
recruitment of children in armed conflict. 78
While this does not assist us in formulating a normative answer,
the solution, when viewed from a political perspective, is probably the
appropriate one. Given the SCSL's limited capacity and role as being
complementary to national justice processes, it was sensible and
necessary to limit prosecutions to those most responsible in
leadership. Although adolescents were ultimately responsible for
carrying out masses of brutal crimes, it is inconceivable that they were
the criminal masterminds.
2. The Rome Statute and the ICC
The Rome Statute expressly excludes jurisdiction over anyone
under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime. 79
During negotiations, an age limit as low as twelve was considered.so
Ultimately, rather than agreeing on the age of criminal responsibility,
it was decided that age limit would be treated as a matter of
jurisdiction.'
An alternative view suggests that persons under eighteen were
excluded because of the conflict between the punitive purpose of the
ICC and the accepted purpose of juvenile justice promoted by
UNICEF and the Children's Caucus. 82 Under this view, making a

77. Crane, supra note 75.

78. This was done under Article 4C of the SLSC Statute. Id.
79. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 26.
80. Roger S. Clark & Otto Triffterer, Article 26: Exclusion ofjurisdictionover
persons under eighteen, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 495

(Otto Triffterer ed., 1999), referenced in Matthew Happold, The Age of Criminal
Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN n.37 (Karin Arts & Vesselin

Popovski eds., 2006).
8 1. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, art. 21 (1994),
available
at
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/
7_4 1994.pdf.
82.

CAUCUS ON CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN THE ICC, JURISDICTION OVER MINORS

(1997), availableat https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/64648e/.
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jurisdictional decision avoided the necessity of establishing a juvenile
justice system within the ICC.8 3
D. Desirabilityof SubjectingAdolescent Soldiers
to the JudicialProcess
This article does not propose subjecting adolescent soldiers of any
age to the adult criminal justice system under any circumstances.
Instead, the following propositions should be read in the context of an
appropriate framework for administering juvenile justice. 84 The main
focus in any judicial proceedings for defendants under the age of
eighteen should be on rehabilitation and reintegration. No exemptions
to this principle are suggested here. However, subjecting adolescent
soldiers to a form of judicial process may be appropriate in certain
circumstances and there may be instances where a prison term would
be an appropriate measure. This would apply for example where
extreme acts of brutality and violence are concerned, or where it is
deemed beneficial to post-conflict reconciliation.
Seeking justice for the victims and ending impunity are stated
aims of international criminal law. The prohibition of the crimes in
question, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide,
is regarded as a fundamental principle of international law. Therefore,
there is an obligation on countries to hold perpetrators accountable.85
This obligation rests uneasily with the exclusion of criminal
responsibility of adolescent soldiers on grounds of age alone. In
Sierra Leone, the people wanted justice in the form of perpetrators

83. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, n.38.
84. "What is ordinarily understood to be appropriate" here refers to the U.N.
Standards as set out in the Beijing Rules. Beijing Rules, supra note 1; see also U.N.
Secretary General, Guidance Note Of The Secretary-General: UN Approach to
at
available
2008),
Children
(Sept.
for
Justice
http://www.unrol.org/files/RoLGuidanceNoteUNApproachJustice-forChildr
enFINAL.pdf.
85. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for InternationalCrime and Serious
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Searching For Peach and Achieving
Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 17 (1996). For
further information relating specifically to child soldiers, see HAPPOLD, supra note
28, at 153-54.
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punished irrespective of age or rank. 86 As one author explains,
"accountability is the antithesis of impunity."8 7
Although both national and international prosecutions are not the
only means by which accountability can be sought, there is
nevertheless a duty to prosecute the types of crimes listed above.8 8
Further, the accountability mechanisms can help acknowledge
victimization during a conflict and bring the perpetrators to justice.8 9
These elements are crucial to the restoration and maintenance of
peace. 90 Unsurprisingly, former child soldiers are often not wanted
back in their communities, and those who do return are often met with
hostility. 91 In the majority of cases, approaches such as a truth and
reconciliation process or a traditional healing ceremony would be
appropriate means. 92 However, situations exist where justice demands
something beyond these voluntary, non-punitive processes.
E. Conclusion on Age Alone as BarringFactor
As we have seen, the artificial age limit is incoherent and does
little to promote justice for the victims or increase the successful
reintegration of the perpetrators.
Rather than granting blanket
immunity to everyone under eighteen, individual criminal
responsibility should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Adolescent
and adult soldiers do not need to be treated equally, and clear age must
be taken into account. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to use
age as one of several factors when normatively assessing the
culpability of an adolescent soldier.

86. Establishment of a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, supra note 63.
87. See Bassiouni, supra note 85, at 19.
88. In other words-war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Id. at
18.
89. U.N. Secretary-General, Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone: Rep. of the Secretary-General,supra note 63, 30.
90. Bassiouni, supra note 85, at 26-28.
91. John Williamson, The Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration of
Child Soldiers: Social and Psychological Transformation in Sierra Leone, 4
INTERVENTION 185, 186-88 (2006).

92. These methods were successfully used after the conflict in Sierra Leone.
See id. at 189-90.
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In domestic legal systems such as those in the United Kingdom
and the United States, juveniles are tried for murder, rape, and other
violent offenses. If convicted, they are subjected to custodial
sentences.
Yet, when these same underlying offenses are recategorized as war crimes and crimes against humanity, an alternative
position on culpability seems to prevail. 93 This is misguided and fails
to address the problem.
However, the circumstances under which adolescent soldiers
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity may require
approaching the problem differently than in the context of adults. One
approach would be to interpret and apply accepted criminal defenses
in ways that respect and give consideration to the particular attributes
of adolescent soldiers. The next two sections will consider these
defenses. Additionally, where an adolescent soldier is deemed
culpable, the question of punishment should be addressed with
rehabilitation and reintegration in mind.
II. THE PLEA OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

The first defense to consider is the plea of superior orders because
of the nature of the military hierarchy. This applies to any soldier
accused of war crimes, but carries extra weight for adolescent soldiers
because of their special characteristics, including lack of judgment,
susceptibility to peer pressure, and lack of understanding of
consequences. To determine the doctrine's particular relevance, the
starting point of this analysis is an exploration of its development in
ICL.
A. EarlyDevelopment of the Doctrine
The rationale for the defense of superior orders is based on three
premises: "(1) the hierarchal nature of the command [of] military
structure; (2) the need to maintain discipline in the military structure;
and (3) the fact that a commanding officer is responsible for the acts

93. This applies in ICL but not necessarily in domestic settings. See infra note
159.
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of his subordinate." 9 4 This defense has, at different points in history
and depending of the particular offense, been regarded as a complete
defense or as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes only. 95
Prior to World War I, the plea of superior orders was commonly
used as a complete defense. 96 Following the war, attempts to establish
an international rule for the superior orders defense proved futile. 97
The Dover Castle98 and the Llandovery Castle9 9 cases reaffirmed that
the plea of superior orders could provide a complete defense, holding
the superior giving the order responsible.100
In 1944, both the American and the British Manuals of Military
Law were revised to limit the superior orders defense to sentence
mitigation only. 01 This was reflected in Article 8 of the Nuremberg
94. The third stage of the test links the defense to the doctrine of command
responsibility.
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 399-400 (1992).

95. According to the conditional liability approach, the general rule is that the
defense of superior orders can be a complete defense, provided the order was not
manifestly illegal. See Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of
the International Criminal Court Versus Customary InternationalLaw, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 172, 174-75 (1999). This was the position most widely taken until the
Nuremberg IMT. Id. The absolute liability approach introduced by the Nuremberg
Charter held that superior orders can never exculpate a soldier for following illegal
orders and had been largely followed in ICL until the drafting of Article 33 of the
Rome Statute. Id.
96. For instance, Article 443 of the British Manual of Military Law stated that
crimes committed under superior orders were not war crimes and could not be
punished.

See HIROMI SATO, THE EXECUTION OF ILLEGAL ORDERS AND

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 15, 20 (2011).

97. Id. at 39-43.
98. German War Trials: Judgment in Case of Commander Karl Neumann
(Dover Castle), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1922) [hereinafter Dover Castle].
99. German War Trials: Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt
(Llandovery Castle), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 704, 704-08 (1922) [hereinafter Llandovery
Castle].
100. Dover Castle, supra note 98, at 707. Two exceptions to the general rule
were considered in the Dover Castle case. Id. First, when a defendant had gone
beyond the scope of the order given. Id. Second, when a defendant was aware that
the order given was illegal. In both cases, the defense would not apply. Id.
101. Sat6, supra note 96, at 16. The timing of this revision is important. By
this time, the Allied Powers would have felt fairly secure that they stood to win the
war, and the possibility of prosecuting German leaders and war criminals became a
reality. This made the Allied Powers realize that the defense of superior orders
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Charter, which provided that superior orders would not exculpate the
accused, but could be used in sentence mitigation.1 02 However, in the
subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings ("Hostages Case"),103 the
Tribunal returned to the World War I position of permitting superior
orders, in the absence of manifest illegality,1 04 as a complete
defense. 0 5
B. Post-War Developments
The ad-hoc tribunals set up to deal with war criminals following
various conflicts throughout the 1990s and early 2000s all followed
the principles of the Nuremberg Charter: while superior orders cannot
be a complete defense, the Tribunals are, when "[they determine] that
justice so requires," permitted to take the defense into consideration
would be raised by those accused of war crimes, thus potentially jeopardizing the
possibility of attaching individual criminal responsibility to the main actors in the
war. See, e.g., Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Associate Supreme Court Justice, to
at
available
1945),
6,
(June
Truman
President
http://avalon.law.yale.edulimt/jack08.asp (noting specifically that members of the
Gestapo and S.S. should be excluded from raising the defense of superior orders).
102.

CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Aug. 8,

1945, art. 8; see also Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity art. 4(b) (Dec. 20, 1945)
availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ccno0.htm.
103. U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (The
Hostages Trial), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. 8 (1949).
104. The "manifest illegality" test was first introduced in R v. Smith, where
the court held: "I think it is a safe rule to lay down that if a soldier honestly believes
that he is doing his duty in obeying the command of his superior, and if the orders
are not so manifestly illegal that he must or ought to have known that they were
unlawful, the private soldier would be protected by the orders of his superior."
Bassiouni, supra note 94, at 419.
105. In 1952, Lauterpacht observed that when the superior orders defense is
raised, a court must take into consideration the nature of military obedience to
leaders, and that a soldier in a war situation cannot be expected to meticulously
weigh the legal merits of orders. 2 LASSA F. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 568 (7th ed. 1952). Contrast this with Roxburg,

who wrote, "[i]n case members of forces commit violations ordered by their
commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders are alone
responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals on their
capture by the enemy." 2 LASSA F. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE 568-69 (3d ed. 1920).
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for the purposes of mitigation. 106 This principle covers situations
where the defendant "lacked a moral choice or was subjected to
coercion," 10 7 and requires an element of duress for the superior orders
defense. 08 One author asserts that superior orders cannot amount to a
per se defense, but are a factual element which may be taken into
account with other admissible defenses such as duress. 0 9
In contrast, another author argues that the rejection of superior
orders as a complete defense has become crystallized in customary
0 However, this is a difficult claim to
international law ("CIL").o"
support, considering that it was not the default position in the
Nuremberg Trials, and that no consensus could be reached on this
issue during the drafting of the Geneva Conventions in 1949.111
Article 33 of the Rome Statute indicates a presumption against the
defense, but permits it in a narrow set of circumstances, excluding
instances of manifest illegality.1" 2 Of note, crimes against humanity

106. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(4), Aug. 14, 2000,
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClndlMJeEw/o3D&.;
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(4),
May 25, 1993: Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(4),
Jan. 31, 2010; United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, On The
Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdictionover Serious CriminalOffences,
§ 21, UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000).
107. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 57, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May
3,1993).
108. McCormack and Simpson note that the potential risk for muddling the
two defenses was demonstrated by the American Bar Association's recommendation
that duress should be the only form of "superior orders" defense allowed. See
Christopher L. Blakesley, Atrocity and Its Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunalsfor
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 189, 219-20 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J.

Simpson eds., 1997).
109. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 251 (2d ed. 2010).

110. Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court: Some
PreliminaryReflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, 156-57 (1999).
111. Andreas Zimmermann, Superior Orders, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 965 (Antonio Cassese, Paola

Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) [hereinafter Zimmerman].
112. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 33(l)(c).
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and genocide are manifestly illegal by definition." 3 Thus, this reintroduces the possibility of superior orders as a complete defense to
war crimes. 114 Its practical application has yet to be tested, but it
appears unlikely that a crime sufficiently grave to result in prosecution
before the ICC would not be manifestly illegal. "'
While it is unusual that the ICC Statute prefers a doctrinal
approach that permits the defense in principle, but makes it virtually
impossible to succeed in practice, its inclusion nevertheless suggests
that the position of absolute liability, as seen in war crimes tribunals in
the post-war period, may not be as clear cut as previously suggested.
The fact that the Rome Statute has returned to a form of conditional
liability indicates that there is still no clear customary rule on
providing a barrier to superior orders as a complete defense.
Consequently, current customary law may permit this defense,
provided the order itself was not manifestly illegal."'
C. Adolescent Soldiers and Superior Orders
The following discussion presumes that current CL permits
superior orders as a complete defense in certain limited circumstances.
In 1945, when the defense of superior orders was reduced in scope, it
was likely influenced by the rank and position held by those indicted
by the IMT at Nuremberg. In the context of child soldiers, this writer
argues that their lower rank requires a more generous application of
the defense.
1. Superior Ordersas a Complete Defensefor Adolescent Soldiers
Under the Rome Statute, the first requirement of the superior
orders defense is that a person must have been under a legal duty to
act. 117 A literal reading indicates that only those fighting on behalf of
national armies can rely on the provision. CIL cannot provide a
different interpretation, as historically, the defense has only been
113. Id. art. 33(2).
114. Id.art. 33(1).
115. Lachlan Harris, The International Criminal Court and the Superior
OrdersDefence, 22 U. TAS. L. REV. 200, 202 (2003).
116. Zimmermann, supra note 111, at 965-66.
117. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 33(1)(a).
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raised in connection with members of armed forces. Arguably, a nonstate rebel group is not bound by state military law, and creates no
legal duty on behalf of adolescent soldiers. This is a harsh but legally
correct outcome. Therefore, the superior orders defense applies only
to adolescent soldiers deployed by state armies.
There is no basis for arguing that any customary rule exists that
would allow courts to go beyond what Article 33 of the Rome Statute
provides, in relation to the specific crimes covered. Therefore, the
defense of superior orders can, at best, provide a complete defense to
war crimes, and courts must rule out the availability of the defense in
relation to crimes against humanity and genocide.
Where it can be established that the adolescent soldier acted
pursuant to an illegal order, courts must establish the adolescent
soldier's knowledge of illegality in order to evaluate the order
itself." 8 If not manifestly illegal, the defense may be permitted to
stand without assessing the element of duress. If the order was
manifestly illegal, then the individual soldier is responsible.
This principle is founded upon the objective knowledge of the
"reasonable man," 119 relative to the personal knowledge of the
defendant.1 20 If Dinstein's view is correct-that it is partly a
subjective test insofar as we test someone's actual knowledge against
that of a reasonable person-then the test itself represents a problem
in the context of adolescent soldiers. The "reasonable person"
standard was not formulated with children or adolescents in mind and
fails to factor in the distinct attributes of youth.12 1 Most legal systems

118. As illustrated in the Pacific War, see, for example., GEOFFREY BEST,
WAR & LAW SINCE 1945 190-91 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994), where soldiers are not
always as disciplined as they ought to be.
119. Lauterpacht describes this as, "[the illegality being] obvious to a person
of ordinary understanding." See Unpublished Memorandum "Punishment of War
Crimes" of 1942, quoted in Yoram Dinstein, The Defence of 'Obedience to Superior
Orders' in International Law 27 (2012).
120. Dinstein argues that the Leipzig trials illustrated how the objective
knowledge test was merely an auxiliary test to ascertain personal knowledge of the
defendant. See id. at 26-29.
121. In 2011, in J.D.B. v North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), the United
States Supreme Court, for the first time, acknowledged the notion of a "reasonable
juvenile." See Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States
Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standardin JD.B. v. North Carolina
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treat children differently because they lack certain attributes, such as
knowledge, judgment, attention, and understanding.122
Children also endure a large psychological impact from combat.
The frequent and repeated subjection to violence may, over time,
desensitize and dehumanize many of the young soldiers and change
their perception of what is "normal." For example, "the greater
suggestibility of children and the degree to which they can be
normalized into violence means that the child soldiers are more likely
to commit atrocities than adults."' 2 3 This process of "normative
regulation may be an especially powerful force during middle
adolescence [generally considered fourteen to seventeen years of
age]."' 24 Adolescents are also more susceptible to peer pressure1 25
and, therefore, may be more likely to follow orders despite awareness
of their wrongful conduct. Further, it is arguable that an adolescent's
knowledge of international law is inferior to the average adult soldier
so a more generous standard should apply.
It is possible, then, to envisage an adolescent soldier being unable
to determine what constitutes a manifestly illegal order because he or
she lacks the moral understanding and knowledge that can be expected
from an adult. While it is not suggested that adolescents are
categorically unable to identify a manifestly illegal order, this should
be assessed against a more lenient "reasonable adolescent" standard.

for Purposes of the Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice
System for Juveniles Be FarBehind?, 47 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501, 502 (2012).
122. See, e.g., U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, 45th Sess., General
Comment No. 10, Children's rights in juvenile justice, at 5, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/GC/10 (April 25, 2007) ("Children differ from adults in their physical and
psychological development, and their emotional and educational needs. Such
differences constitute the basis for the lesser culpability of children in conflict with
the law."); see also Beijing Rules, supra note 1 (concerning juvenile justice).
123. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 10. This is reflected in Human Rights
Watch's report on the child soldier problem in Burma: "I felt nothing against my
friends because they were just obeying orders. We didn't talk about it.... If you
don't follow orders that means you are against your country.. .. If ordered to kill a
baby and I don't, I'll be sentenced to death and someone else would still kill the
baby. So I would kill the baby." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2002, supra note 17, at 96.
124. Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age differences in resistance
to peer influence, 43 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1531 (2007).
125. Id.
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However, even using a "reasonable adolescent" standard, there is
a danger that adolescent soldiers recruited at a very young age have
been subjected to such high degree of violence that their normative
perception is completely distorted. This means than even though
persons fifteen to seventeen years old would ordinarily be able to
distinguish between right and wrong, someone recruited at age ten
might be unable to make that distinction by the time he or she reaches
ages fifteen to seventeen. As a result, the age of recruitment should be
given considerable weight in sentence mitigation.
We have established a serious problem with forced recruitment of
adolescent soldiers.1 26 Since some juveniles are forced to take part in
armed hostilities, we should accept that these same juveniles have no
freedom to choose whether to obey a superior order. Even where an
order is not backed by an immediate threat of violence, as required for
the defense of duress to apply, there is likely to be an ongoing threat
of possible violence. This is sufficient to satisfy the "moral choice
test," which asks whether a "moral choice" to not follow an order was
in fact possible.' 2 7
Permitting the plea of superior orders to provide a complete
defense or to be applied in sentence mitigation would be consistent
with the current position on child solders. ICL focuses on those who
recruit and use child soldiers. The doctrine of command responsibility
allows us to hold a superior accountable for the actions of lower ranks.
Therefore, we have a tool by which justice can be secured for the
victims. By allowing the plea of superior orders to exculpate the
adolescent soldier, focus can be shifted to rehabilitation and
reintegration, rather than punishment. This would reach the same
substantive outcome as what the current lack of framework does, but
would do so on a principled basis. However, permitting superior
orders as a complete defense to war crimes should remain the
exception, and subject to the requirements of the test being met. But,
as noted in the context of adolescent soldiers, these requirements
should be applied more leniently.

126. See supra Section I(B)(2).
127. Erdemovid, supra note 59,

145.
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III. DEFENSE OF DURESS
Even if an adolescent soldier was aware of the illegality of an
order, or if the order is deemed manifestly illegal, it may still be
possible to rely on a plea of duress.' 28 Unlike the plea of superior
orders, the defense of duress may also be available to members of
non-state armed groups, and therefore, has a broader application.
A. Development of the Doctrine
The defense of duress can be described as when "the actor's free
will is impaired by an irresistible exterior force that imposes a mental
compulsion," 29 or, more poetically, "[the] concession to the instinct
of human survival." 30
The general rule of the defense of duress is when (1) the crime
was committed to avoid an immediate danger to life or serious injury;
(2) there was no possible escape from the situation; (3) the crime
committed was not disproportionate to the danger or harm faced; and
(4) the person committing the crime must not have put himself in the
position where an act of coercion was unavoidable.'31
When duress is raised as a defense, the superior order defense
loses 'any legal relevance," 32 and it is necessary to make a clear legal
distinction between the two defenses.' 3 3 Conversely, when the plea of
superior orders can be permitted to stand as a complete defense, it is
unnecessary to consider whether duress was a factor, since culpability
has already been rejected.134 Often, a plea of superior orders will

128. Gaeta, supra note 95, at 184.
129. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, DEFENSES
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 43 (2d ed. 2008).
130. BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 439.

IN CONTEMPORARY

131. Id. at 441. This reflects the guidance provided in the United Nations War
Crimes Commission Report. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, 15 LAW REPORTS OF
at
174
(1949),
available
OF
WAR
CRIMINALS
TRIALS

[hereinafter
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/Law-ReportsVol-15.pdf
UNWCC Report]. The separate majority opinion in the Erdemovi6 case confirms
the test's continued applicability. See Erdemovid, supra note 59, 42.
132. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 285 (2d ed. 2008).
133. KNOOPS, supra note 129, at 43.

134. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 111, at 966.
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include an element of duress.135 However, each defense stands alone,
without reference to the other.
The defense of duress has not been successful in the context of
unlawful killings, but it has not been completely rejected.13 6 Broadly
speaking, civil legal systems tend to permit duress as a complete
defense in certain limited circumstances, even when considering a
murder prosecution. 137 Alternatively, common law systems have
generally rejected duress in circumstances that provide anything more
than a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes.' 38 Prior to the
drafting of the Rome Statute, there were no real attempts to develop a
coherent doctrine of criminal defenses in ICL. 139
In 1997, Draien Erdemovid appealed his conviction for his role in
the Srebenica Massacre during the Bosnian War. 140 In his appeal, the
court extensively considered the role of duress as a complete defense,
specifically whether duress could provide "a complete defense to a
soldier charged with crimes against humanity or war crimes where the
soldier has killed innocent persons." 4 1 The majority ruled against

135. Although it is arguable that when the order is first issued it is not
necessarily accompanied by a threat, the soldier is only subjected to duress and
coercion when he seeks to resist the order. See Erdemovid, supra note 59, 15.
136. In Erdemovid, Cassese's dissenting opinion notes that duress had been
invoked as early as 1921 in the Llandovery Case. See supra section II(A);
Erdemovi6, supra note 59, 32. In the Einzatzgrupppen Case, it was held that
"there is no law which requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life or suffer
serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime which he condemns.... No court
will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull a lethal
lever." BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 444.
137. Judge Cassese in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, supra note 59.
138. Kai Ambos, Other Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY,
VOLUME 11012 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
139. KNOOPS, supra note 129, at 127. Erdemovid confirms that no consistent
and uniform state practice can be found with respect to the acceptance or rejection of
47-50. Nor can it
duress as a defense to murder. See Erdemovi6, supra note 59,
be said that such a practice is underpinned by opinio juris. Id. Consequently, a
customary rule has not been formed. Id.
140. Erdemovid, supra note 59, 32. Interestingly, the defendant in Erdemovid
did not seek to exculpate himself on grounds of duress, but the Tribunal nevertheless
proceeded to address the issue. Id.
141. Id.
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Erdemovid, finding that duress, in the context of the killing of
innocent civilians, can only be used for mitigation purposes. 142
The dissent argued that when the victims would have been killed
regardless of the defendant's participation, then duress should be
available as a complete defense. 143 The majority, rejecting this
proposition, noted that ICL must be developed with the purpose of
social policy and the purposes of ICL in mind.144
The Rome Statute neither confirms nor rejects the possibility of
duress being available as a complete defense to war crimes and crimes
against humanity.145 However, for the first time in ICL history, an
express provision was created that permits duress as a complete
defense. 146 This provision, Article 31(d), may be read as being
broader in scope than the line taken by the ITCY, but has not yet been
tested. Its threshold requirement is that the evil caused must not be
greater than that avoided.1 47

142. KNOOPS, supra note 129, at 209.
143. Erdemovi6, supra note 59. 16. Although a controversial point, this was
not an entirely new idea, having been successfully pleaded in multiple cases, all of
which were acting pursuant to CCL no. 10: "Perhaps . . . it will never be satisfied

where the accused is saving his own life at the expense of his victim, since there are
enormous, perhaps insurmountable, philosophical, moral and legal difficulties in
putting one life in the balance against that of others in this way: how can a judge
satisfy himself that the death of one person is a lesser evil that the death of another?
Conversely, however ... where there is a high probability that the person under
duress will not be able to save the lives of the victims whatever he does-then
duress may." Id. 1 42. Judge Li's contested this in his separate dissent: "The
absurdity of this argument is apparent, because it would justify every one of the
criminal group who participated in the joint massacre of innocent persons.
Moreover, there is absolutely no authority for such a proposition." Id. 11.
144. Id. 178. It is worth considering that the ICTY was established by United
Nations Security Council resolutions, and were set up to deal with specific, tangible
conflicts and with a clear mandate "[to] halt and effectively redress the widespread
and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law ... and to contribute
thereby to the restoration and maintenance and peace [of the former Yugoslavia]."
Id. 75. The Tribunal was intended to play a role in establishing and maintaining
political stability, which further reinforces the need for "policy concerns." This sets
it apart from the ICC, which was created without a specific conflict in mind.
145. KNOOPS, supra note 129, at 131.
146. Id. at 130.
147. Id. at 131.
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The moral rationale for rejecting duress as a complete defense to
the killing of innocent people is understandable. However, if a soldier
is ordered to fire at civilians or lose his life, it is highly likely the
soldier will fire at the civilians and risk future prosecution,
irrespective of the legal position. Even where the death penalty is
applicable, it seems unlikely that a human being would choose certain
imminent death over possible future death. But, although the civilians'
risk of death will not change, it may be correct to reject duress as a
complete defense.
Instead, allowing duress to be raised in sentence mitigation
affords courts wide discretion without jeopardizing the administration
of justice.' 4 8 Questions remain as to how Article 31(d) will be
interpreted to permit, in certain limited circumstances, duress as a
complete defense to war crimes, and whether Erdemovi will be relied
upon for guidance. The Erdemovid dissent argued that because the
defense was permitted generally in ICL, and that no special rule had
emerged in relation to the killing of innocent people, then the general
rule should prevail.149 It has been suggested that the Rome Statute
provides the basis for an emerging rule on duress,1 50 which is
consistent with the Rome Statute's intention to "reflect general
principles of ICL."s15 On this basis, the discussion will proceed with
reference to the principles of Article 31(d).
B. Adolescent Soldiers and Duress
The defense of duress may be useful to address some of the
problems specific to adolescent soldiers, such as whether to apply it as
a complete defense or solely for use in sentence mitigation.
148. This discretion would permit the court to impose no sentence at all. See
Erdemovi6, supra note 59, 58.
149. Id. 12.
150. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 158. In this writer's view, the 1949 position
of the UNWCC is reflected in the Rome Statute. The concluding remarks in the
report, ". . . if the facts do not warrant the successful pleading of duress as a defense,

they may constitute an argument in mitigation of punishment" suggest that certain
facts could in fact warrant a successful plea of duress, whether or not the alleged
crime involved the killing of innocent persons or not. See UNWCC Report, supra
note 131, at 174.
151.

GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 24, 91

(2005).
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1. Duress as a Complete Defensefor Adolescent Soldiers Charged
With the Killing ofInnocent Civilians
The application of the defense of duress is fact dependent, as the
adolescent soldier must establish that he was the object of an
immediate threat of harm that could not be escaped. But, as discussed
earlier, an adolescent may more readily believe a threat than an adult.
And, due to his or her susceptibility to peer pressure, less coercive
means may be sufficient to establish the existence of an immediate
threat. 152
There is a difficult question of proportionality. In Erdemovid, the
fact that the court did not engage in a balancing exercise is appealing
from an ethical perspective, but more problematic in the normative
context of adolescent soldiers. We have established that a duty exists
to protect children from harm. This duty extends to adolescent
soldiers, even when they have committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The tension between the duty to protect adolescent
soldiers and the duty to protect innocent civilians in situations of
conflict must be resolved through a case-by-case analysis. However,
the particular characteristics of adolescents1 53 should be given specific
consideration when assessing duress.
The duty to protect adolescents should create a heightened
proportionality standard, in terms of harm threatened versus harm
inflicted. One writer has pointed out that given the close decision and
vocal dissent in Erdemovid, the decision may well have been the other
way around had Erdemovid been a juvenile at the time of committing
the crimes.1 54 As a result, when it can be established that an
adolescent has been forcibly recruited, duress should, provided the
finding is supported by the facts, be permissible as a complete
defense.
Conversely, where an adolescent has genuinely volunteered to
join an armed group or national army, his or her ability to rely on the
plea of duress must be treated no differently than if applied to an adult
soldier.15 5 As discussed in Section I(C)(1), at least a small percentage
152. See supra Parts I(B)-(B)(2) for a discussion of the particular attributes of
adolescent soldiers.
153. Id.
154. Rikhof, supra note 12, at 8-9.
155. HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at 158.
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of adolescent soldiers join an army or non-state armed group
voluntarily. Whatever their motive, it would be difficult to argue that
the adolescent did not knowingly put himself in a position where he
might be forced to carry out illegal orders. But, a grey area exists
where adolescents voluntarily join armies or armed groups as a result
of manipulation and subtle pressures. 156 While it may be easier to
morally excuse a young person who has been tricked or unduly
pressured into joining an armed group, one must ask whether the
reasons why someone has joined matter, in the context of securing
justice for the victims.
Again, we are faced with the tension between the protection of
juveniles and the protection of civilians. Similar to the conclusion
reached above, a case-by-case determination should be applied, but
the test ought to be applied more leniently to adolescents than to
adults in order to acknowledge the particular characteristics of
adolescents.
As such, duress may be available to adolescent soldiers as a
complete defense to war crimes and crimes against humanity,
including the killing of innocent civilians. This position is defensible
because of the general obligation to acknowledge the attributes of
youth, and is consistent with a normative commitment to protect
children in armed conflict, while respecting the duty to prosecute war
criminals.
A final issue arising in Erdemovid is the argument that if the
victims would have died regardless, duress should provide a full
defense.15 7 While this seems like an attractive proposition in the
context of an adolescent soldier, it is still problematic. It would allow
for the continual excusal of responsibility and result in a lack of
accountability. But, it is an argument that could be sensibly used in
sentence mitigation and not in support of duress as a complete

156. COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 13, at 30. This would presumably
fail the criteria for enlisting being "genuinely voluntary" under the Optional
Protocol, and it may be possible to attach blame to the recruiters, but is not
necessarily relevant to the application of duress as a defense. See Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in
armed conflict, G.A. Res 54/263, UN Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
157. Judge Cassese in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, supra note 59 1 42.
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defense. What may be appropriate in those circumstances would be to
consider the possibility of a "guilty, but not punishable verdict." 58
IV. CONCLUSION

The age limit in the Rome Statute is arbitrary and unhelpful.
There is no coherent legal foundation for setting the age at eighteen,
and it is clear that someone younger can be responsible for heinous
crimes.
Consequently, the age bar should be removed and each case
should be assessed individually on the premise that, in principle,
fifteen to seventeen year old combatants can be held criminally
responsible. When an adolescent soldier is held responsible for war
crimes or crimes against humanity, he should be treated according to
established principles on juvenile justice, as prescribed by the CRC
and the Beijing Rules.
The rationale for this approach is to benefit both the victims and
the perpetrators. Without an international consensus on how
adolescent soldiers should be treated, the issue will be left to a myriad
of domestic judicial systems. The various ways domestic regimes
handle child soldiers is far from uniform and raises concerns about the
treatment of juveniles.1 59
The primary use of ICL by contemporary international tribunals
since Nuremberg has been to make an example of "those most
responsible." By limiting the reach of these courts to this small group,
158. AMBOS, supra note 138, at 1046.
159. In 2002, two child soldiers aged fourteen and sixteen were reportedly
charged with treason by the Ugandan authorities. See HAPPOLD, supra note 28, at
142. Another controversial example is the case of Omar Kahdr, a Canadian national
who was captured in Afghnaistan by the American forces in 2002, when he was just
fifteen. See Press Release, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, UN Special Representative Calls for Canada and The
United States to Remove All Obstacles For The Release Of Omar Khadr, (May 5,
2010), available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-releases/5Mayl0/;
Omar

Ahmed

Khadr,

HUMAN

RIGHTS

WATCH,

(Oct.

25,

2012),

Khadr was accused of
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/25/omar-ahmed-khadr.
killing an American soldier with a grenade while fighting with al Qaeda insurgents.
Id. He was held in Afganistan and upon his sixteenth birthday transferred to the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Id. Despite being identified as a child soldier
by the UN, he remained in Guantanamo until his repatriation to Canada in 2012. Id.
Kadr is the youngest inmate detained in Guantanamo Bay. Id.
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the law has largely avoided complicated groups such as adolescent
soldiers. Prosecuting the most responsible war criminals in an
international court sends a strong political message that there is a will
to end impunity. And from a political perspective, the current
framework makes sense. Neither the international tribunals nor the
ICC have the capacity, nor were they intended to, replace domestic
legal regimes.
Nevertheless, in the context of adolescent soldiers, we are left
with a group of offenders that ICL is ill equipped to handle. There is a
clear obligation in international law to prosecute those responsible for
war crimes and crimes against humanity. This obligation is difficult to
reconcile with the current lack of position on child soldiers. Although
there are jurisdictional barriers preventing prosecution, these do not
exculpate an individual from criminal responsibility.' 60 To end
impunity, "those most responsible" should include everyone
responsible for the worst crimes, as envisaged by the SecretaryGeneral in relation to Sierra Leone.161
To balance the duty to protect minors with the obligation to end
impunity, consideration should be given to the military hierarchy and
the existence of superior orders and duress. Adolescents, to a greater
degree than adult soldiers, may be coerced into committing war
crimes and crimes against humanity. However, defense doctrines can
be used to exculpate these adolescent offenders. In particular, when an
adolescent is forcibly recruited, the plea of duress must be permitted
to provide a complete defense to war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Conversely, where an adolescent has joined an army or
armed group on a genuinely voluntary basis, he should no more be
able to rely on these defenses than his adult counterpart. In those
circumstances, age should be taken into account merely for sentence
mitigation.
There is currently no clear normative statement on the culpability
of adolescent soldiers. While this article does not propose that
international law should take over the function of domestic law, more
resources should be devoted to developing international law to deal
with adolescent soldiers as perpetrators of war crimes. This would
assist on two levels: to hold adolescent soldiers accountable where
160. KNOOPS, supra note 129, at 129.
161. See discussion supra Part I(C)(1).
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appropriate, but equally, to safeguard their rights through a framework
that can be consistently applied in international and domestic settings.
In other words, if the international community is serious about
tackling the child soldier problem, then it is insufficient to only view
the child soldier as a victim.
The maxim malitia supplet aetatem was used in 18th century
common law to express that age alone was insufficient to discount
criminal culpability and that the person's understanding and judgment
were the primary factors to be assessed. 162 This principle deserves
some thought in the context of adolescent soldiers. To start, removing
the artificial age limit could address many problems in ICL and may
pave the way for formulating a coherent and principled strategy to
address the child soldier problem.

162. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *23.
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